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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (1987 & Supp.
1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Tax Commissions's factual finding that
Respondent is not barred from assessing a deficiency for the
audit period because Petitioner's accounting manager had the
authority to sign a waiver is supported by substantial evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing factual determinations the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l6(4)(g)

1

(1987 & Supp. 1991), requires this Court to review the whole
record and determine whether the Tax. Commission's findings are
supported by "substantial evidence."

"'Substantial evidence' is

that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion."

Boston

First Nat, v. Salt Lake City Bd., 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah
1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1987 & Supp. 1991)
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis
of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the
following:

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made
or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court; . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110(8) (1987 & Supp. 1991)
Except if a deficiency is due to fraud with intent to evade
tax or of a failure to file a return, the amount of taxes imposed
by this chapter shall be assessed within three years after the
return was filed and if not so assessed no proceeding for the
collection of the taxes shall be begun after the expiration of
the period.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 3, 1990, in response to taxes assessed against it
by the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission
2

("Division"), Radix Corporation ("Petitioner") commenced formal
adjudicative proceedings before the Utah State Tax Commission
("Respondent").

Record at 137. On January 8, 1991 Respondent

issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final
Decision.

Id-

0n

January 28, 1991, Petitioner filed a petition

for reconsideration which was subsequently denied by Respondent's
order issued February 21, 1991. Record at 19 & 117.

Petitioner

now appeals to this Court for review of Respondent's Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent correctly found that the Division is not barred
from assessing Petitioner Utah sales and use tax for the period
January 1, 1986 to March 31, 1987 because Petitioner's accounting
manager, pursuant to her authority, executed a valid statute of
limitations waiver.

Respondent's finding is supported by

substantial evidence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the audit of Petitioner's books, Diane Fanger,
Petitioner's accounting manager, was present and assisted Gary M.
Allred, the Division's auditor, by providing requested documents.
Tr. at 34. When Petitioner's accounting manager was unable to
3

provide requested documents, she would indicate that she had to
consult with or seek permission from her supervisor, Timothy
Draper.

Tr. at 34 & 35-

On or about April 14, 1989 the Division

presented Petitioner's accounting manager with an "Agreement,
Waiver of Statute of Limitations."

Record at 152. The waiver

functioned to extend the period of time during which Petitioner
could review the preliminary audit findings without creating a
statute of limitations defense which would jeopardize collection
of the assessment.

Record at 152. After having the waiver fully

explained to her, Petitioner's accounting manager executed the
agreement never indicating that she either did not have the
authority to sign, or that she needed anyone's approval.
33 & 34.

Tr. at

Further, the Division's auditor never had any reason to

question Petitioner's accounting manager's authority to execute
the waiver.

Tr. at 36.

The only evidence presented at the

formal hearing before Respondent that Petitioner's accounting
manager did not have authority to sign the agreement was a
statement by Timothy Draper that •'[c]ompany policy specifically
does not give her authority to sign those things . . . ."
21.

Tr. at

In its decision, after considering Timothy Draper's

testimony, Respondent noted Mthat the Petitioner presented no
further evidence regarding the authority of the accounting
manager either by way of a copy of the company policy, the
4

company's bylaws, or the testimony of any other corporate
officer."

Record at 139. Respondent thus found:

Petitioner's mere assertions that the accounting
manager did not have the authority to sign the statute
of limitation waiver agreement, when viewed in light of
all the evidence presented, does not support a finding
that the accounting manager acted outside the scope of
her authority. Therefore the Tax Commission finds that
the Respondent [the Division] is not barred from
assessing a deficiency for the audit period in question
by the statute of limitations.
Record at 140.
ARGUMENT
A.

RESPONDENT'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S ACCOUNTING
MANAGER HAD AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE A VALID STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS WAIVER IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
Respondent's finding that Diane Fanger, Petitioner's

accounting manger, had authority to execute a statute of
limitations waiver is supported by substantial evidence; hence,
its decision should be affirmed.
Actual authority may be either express or implied.
2d, Agency, § 73.

3 Am Jur

"The actual authority of an agent may be

implied from the words and conduct of the parties and the facts
and circumstances attending the transaction in question."
v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978);

Bowen

Zions First National

Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988).
As evidenced by the record, the words and conduct of
Petitioner's accounting manager established her authority by
5

implication to execute the statute of limitations waiver.

Id.

While conducting the audit of Petitioner, the Division dealt
directly with Petitioner's accounting manager.

During that time,

the Division requested numerous items from Petitioner.
Petitioner's accounting manager provided those items.

If there

were documents or information that she was not authorized to
provide, "she would indicate that she'd either have to get these
from Tim Draper or talk to Tim Draper."

Tr. at 34. Thus, by her

words and conduct, Petitioner's accounting manager implied that
while she had authority to produce some information, she did not
have authority to produce all that was requested, in which case
she would obtain the necessary authorization.

In essence, she

defined the scope of her authority.
When the Division's auditor requested that Petitioner sign
the Waiver of Statute of Limitations, Petitioner's accounting
manager never stated or otherwise indicated that she did not have
the authority to do so or that she needed anyone's approval.
Rather, Petitioner's accounting manager, after having the
document fully explained to her, executed the waiver.
Petitioner's accounting manager's lack of any statement
indicating that executing the document was beyond the scope of
her authority and her conduct of signing the waiver established
her authority by implication. Bowen, 576 P.2d at 864;
6

Zions

First National Bank, 762 P.2d at 1095Further, the actual authority of Petitioner's accounting
manager may be implied from the facts and circumstances attending
the audit.

Id.

The record indicates that the Division's auditor

dealt primarily with Petitioner's accounting manager throughout
the audit and that she oversaw the audit on Petitioner's behalf.
These facts indicate that it was she who had the authority to
execute the waiver.

Further, the audit involved corporate

records and documents which are those ordinarily created and
maintained by a corporate accounting manager.

Moreover, a

preliminary audit is typically reviewed by a corporation's
accounting manager who then confers with its officers and
directors.

Therefore, under such circumstances, it was well

within the responsibility and authority of Petitioner's
accounting manager to decide whether or not to create additional
time to review the preliminary audit.

Hence, the facts and

circumstances attending the audit further indicate that
Petitioner's accounting manager impliedly had authority to
execute the waiver.
Petitioner attacks Respondent's determination on several
grounds.

In its brief, Petitioner points to the fact that its

accounting manager "neither holds any corporate office nor was
given specific authority to waive legal defenses of the
7

corporation."

Petitioners brief at 4 (emphasis added).

Petitioner further argues that Respondent offered no "testimony
or corporate documents from any source that would establish a
grant of authority to Ms. Fanger . . . ."

Id.

However,

Petitioner's argument fails because the issue here is whether
Petitioner's accounting manager had implied actual authority, not
whether she had express actual authority.

Therefore, any lack of

testimony or documents evidencing a express grant of authority is
irrelevant.
Further, Petitioner argues that Timothy Draper's
"uncontradicted testimony" established that no policy allowed
Petitioner's accounting manager to execute the waiver and that it
is "pure guesswork" to assume that Petitioner's accounting
manager could be vested with authority to sign the waiver.1
Petitioner's brief at 8.

Notwithstanding, "Implied authority

embraces authority to do whatever acts are incidental to, or are
necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform, the main
authority expressly delegated to the agent."

Bowen, 576 P.2d at

864; Zions First National Bank, 762 P.2d at 1095.

1

By examining

In its brief, Petitioner attempts to support Timothy
Draper's testimony with the affidavit of Alan C. Reed.
Petitioner's brief at 8.
However, that affidavit was never
introduced at the formal hearing before the Tax Commission.
Rather, it was merely attached as "Exhibit A" to Petitioner's
petition for reconsideration.

8

the purpose of the waiver, it becomes evident that the authority
Petitioner's accounting manager exercised is a necessary, usual
and proper function of a corporate accounting manager.
When conducted, the audit period was well within statute of
limitations period for assessment*

However, because it would

have been impossible for Petitioner to review the Division's
preliminary audit before expiration of the three year period, the
execution of the waiver merely ensured that by giving Petitioner
additional time to review the audit, the Division was not
jeopardizing subsequent collection of the taxes owed.

In other

words, the Division did not want to create a previously
nonexistent defense by merely giving Petitioner additional time
to review the preliminary audit.
Petitioner broadly characterizes the authority its
accounting manager exercised as "authority to waive legal
defenses of the corporation."

Petitioners brief at 8.

Notwithstanding, this authority is more accurately described as
simply the authority of an accounting manager to oversee and
facilitate a tax audit.

Such authority is easily considered

necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish the responsibilities
expressly delegated to a corporate accounting manager and
therefore encompassed by the doctrine of implied authority.

9

CONCLUSION
Respondent found that the Division is not barred by the
statute of limitations from assessing a deficiency for the audit
period in question because Petitioner's accounting manager,
pursuant to her authority, executed a valid waiver.
The actual authority of Petitioner's accounting manager may
be implied from the words and conduct of the parties and the
facts and circumstances attending the audit. As the record
indicates during the audit the Division dealt primarily with
Petitioner's accounting manager who, when requested to produce
information, would either produce the information or state that
she was not authorized to do so. When requested to sign the
waiver, Petitioner's accounting manager never indicated that it
was beyond the scope of her authority to sign the waiver or that
she needed anyone's approval before she signed.
The only evidence offered by Petitioner to show that its
accounting manger did not have authority to sign the waiver was
the mere statement of Timothy Draper that company policy does not
specifically grant to its accounting manger the authority to sign
waivers.

Therefore in reviewing the whole record it is evident

that the Respondent's findings are supported by substantial

10

evidence and, hence, should be affirmed,
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